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observation 1:
synkar’s notes:
3 - everyone always leaves books, you must demand the production of effects, the world has militarized itself against the production of new effects, that's why the authors goal is a purely political one, to have impact, you must fight against the world, which means the world will fight you too, and most of the time win. the act of what we do is now nothing more than an unfairly placed boxing match. you either take the fight every time and know that it is a low thing, a little thing not worth serious spiritual resistance, only pure struggle, or.
4 - i disagree also (not that fjl directly does) with homer's alexander the great into philo of alexandria, that the one who motivates the placement of the city is the interpretor, it is indeed the production of affects, homer only comes to life by himself through philo, but philo has not invented homer, very much homer has invented philo.
5 - no, the question in this paper is not welian, weil already dealt with the issue of attention or whatever she called that concept of going into a work despite reckoning with it, or refusing its contents on account of consensus or belief or its very nature. the question here is deeper, and its hinted at when lyotard says he questions the very difference in form between the genres, and specifically says in it, not under it. meaning hes not writing a theory under a fiction, hes writing a theory in a fiction, hes messing up the boundary. and why does this matter? this matters because hes trying to say that the arguments can only be approached correctly when the violence is already dealt. you can only truly argue and talk with this book when you've stopped arguing and talking with yourself, and by with yourself, naturally this means with everything you hold tear and close to yourself, so that you may open yourself up with the form. and what will the form give you? it will give you the tools, the rhetorical machinery will set the ground, to advance passed the requirement to be persuaded or intimidated, so that finally you may approach the book. what happens after you approach the book is not that you have suddenly submitted yourself to it, but that now you are in the open field where interaction with the book doesnt mean that you have to enter into the logic of a discussion rather than a conversation (deleuze's dichotomy, where the difference is the extent to which you directly vs indirectly encounter the communicative juxtaposition). when you allow the book to enter through you, you are writing your own book when you are facing it, you are no longer thinking about it as a book, a piece that objects to you, but as a form of interaction. the style in the book is what locks you into the substance (the lexis into the logos). the point of the lexis isnt however the point of weilian attention, it isnt about how capable you are to enter into the book even though it seems thats what me and jfl are talking about, its only the point of creating the pieces, the pieces dont necessarily exist outside of us but they are not a part of us either, we dont need to contain what we write the same way a fiction writer doesnt feel the need to defend the story he wrote. so what is left? whats left is that we still must use the behavioral logic of persuation to enact the fictive theory back onto the world. this is whats lost in new age holistic correlationist writings, you have to think of a way to fight the fiction, not just fall to it, this is why i say its not a matter of submission
6 - i think arguments from behalf of natural order, natural philosophy (in the sense of theology) like the way augustine speaks of final causes through aristotle, like, divine order as an imposition, a certain emerging quality of things need not have quantitative roles or a series of criteria in order to impede upon itself, is born to juxtapose pluralistic society and all its inability to parse authorship, by transgressing it even more rather than fixing it. here's the strategy, i read shakespears hamlet, declare it falsely authored on behalf of it being a work of literature (it being "written" rather than thought of) then turn it into a book of philosophy, publish it with "hamlet, shakespear's synkar" because he speaks through me, i dont speak through him. he wrote the book but i made it, so i am its primary author, he speaks through me, but i didnt invent it, i didnt pass through it nor think of it in any sense, i used thought to make it but i didnt make it through thought, it was he who thought it and i who made it, because it was a ghost, it didnt exist before i wrote it, and those who thought they engaged the book were merely viewing a blueprint as if they were reading the book, that only now, hundreds of years later once i created it, can they really sit and think they are reading what they thought they were reading the whole time. and even if shakespear thinks "damn this should have been a book of philosophy but its too late now" he would still be wrong, for it is not that it ought to be but that it is, not in the sense of justice as lyotard recognizes it but in the sense of actuality, it is no matter of justice whether it turns out that hamlet is ever invented or not (invented by me, and only interpreted "later" (earlier) by shakespear himself) it is only a matter that those who recognize that it is so, that they are looking at the "real" hamlet, fail to worry about what the criteria for it is, that makes one piece the blueprint and the other the actual version, so long as they recognize that i created but in fact did not write it, even if i used all my powers (imagination, originality, novelty, creation, writing, thinking) in order to conceive of it, i am only a vessel through which it can come to be, its mother or birthgiver rather than what makes it so. and even if say, somebody in the future re-writes on top of my book a re-literarization of the theory, then it is up to question whether my book is the original or theirs is, so long as it is no falsely assumed that this process has an end, or that public opinion or level of impact determines it as such, also that the author himself cannot think that he is the originator of the opinion, even if he can carry it. there is no judge in this case, but there is a divine process of realization that occurs at some point, that isnt fixed and can never be determined, because there is no prophecy, but those that choose to later speak of the book in the wrong sense, so that they make me the translator or re-creator and shakespear the relater or original creator, must know that they dont posess the ability to evaluate it for what it is, as i have deemed, and as can never be argued but can be went against on account of divine intuition, but one without any criteria.
and as such this is a new genre of writing, but one that must not believe there is a primacy of theory over literature, but that still recognizes how theory is the optimal form of writing, as it is structurally the form of writing that wants to behave as if it has a point but doesnt, yet the form of it still is not about conveying, yet the form of it still is in the way that it is of a higher order, for one which needs no particular criteria to justify comparatively why, yet it seems obvious when you consider the concept as such.
strategy: the subject stands holding the two books, shakespears hamlet is a blueprint on its own, but in the hands of synkar its a book, and thats because the title of shakespears's synkar (hamlet, also) is in the other hand, and the title justifies the book. the latter, shakespear's synkar, created by synkar, is shakespears book, and vice versa, the blueprint is synkar's work, even though shakespear created it, because it could never not be the work of the one who allowed it. now, this is the first question, of who's book is who's, but the second is which is the real book? there are no wrong answers. and if you were to answer that it is synkar's work (shakespear's hamlet) this would be the wrong answer, even if there are no wrong answers, because the objective is the subjective and vice versa when it comes to the question of the new form of naturalism, or the new genre.
6.5 - i dont agree with you about the naming of things. these things should never be named, it has become that the names themselves have called to their worth, unfairly.
7 - the interview format is the same as internet dialogues, in that protection is the ground of the spirits of your vicinity, they come to protect you when theyve learned of you (which isnt right away), the privilidge has to be fought for indeed in this format, but the privilidge simply requires breaking past the ability for the medium to contain you or work in its logic, it requires breaking the medium rather than the messenger, you cant fight the interviwer but you can pre-emptively fight those who will attempt to mould it. they will always get away with doing it, but you can also signal to the world certain things that their parody wont be able to fully contain. the privilidge is always in the homeowner of the medium, but you can create workarounds and attempt a rupture in coherence. as for attaining your own homeownership, you can also avoid placing your own home too early, or you could nomadically navigate this issue, but its important to recognize how not engaging, answering questions, taking others seriously, or considering problems that you yourself havent formed, are a valuable form of protection and cant be taken lightly.
8/9 - on page 8 and 9 of just gaming, lyotard and thebeaud discuss the question of judgement, community and the position between the writer and the reader as it pertains to philosophical discourse and art. lyotard begins this by arguing that writing is irresponsible, akin to montaigne's essayistic form, unburdened by answering questions or relevant problematics. this mimics deleuze's distinction between dialogue and conversation, the former being symmetrical to inquiry and response, the latter being tangentially related in waves, never directly exposed to reciprocity or felt demand. thebeaud makes a distinction that writing tends toward artifice, often mistaken for vivacity, whereas speech may appear more spontaneous but is less constructed, and also that the readers existence burdens the writer. lyotard builds on this viewpoint by suggesting that the very idea of an imagined reader compromises the writing, for example the economic requirements of balzac during his time had him appealing to a bourgeoise readership that fundamentally altered his motivations, interests, structural style etc, is the first example i could think of here. lyotard also argues that dedications at the beginning of works isnt equivalent to addressed readership. lyotards main problem with what he calls classicism is that the latent system of values introduced by the public plagues the reader. he finalizes his viewpoint by arguing that although art is less implicitly regulating, its more explicitly regulating in that the author is expected to constantly attain to the whims of a much more abstract but also faster and more chaotic and demanding, unable system of selection, akin to the expectations of the wider modernity. and here's where i'm going to argue against lyotard's point, because even to a personal degree i feel awfully cynically vengeful towards his otherwise, almost ironically optimisitc attitude here.
what lyotard is missing is that since interluctorness has dissapeared, you're not always going to find a public, or a receiver. the economy of the logic of fashion, or what we deem as modernity, has no problem economizing the work of experimentality itself, from celibacy into castration. it will easily find a way to remove the question of the subject of history rather than its postulation. with the economy of the world, you now find an economy of principle in the actions of man. the receiver no longer exist, because it is very easy indeed for them, to turn writing for nobody in question, to writing for nobody in general. now you are writing for nobody, even when you have a public, and you usually dont get to have one. but if you do, now you get a cult of friends rather than a life of friends, and by what do we mean? you see, those who follow you follow you now economically, as well. they are not interested in existentially questioning you, but alas reinserting their collective will. they would have never barred you from releasing a book with no life in reference, this happened - it had no impact, but it had readers. now its the opposite, even if you have readers, you will have no impact. thats what the economy of man has produced onto the celibate, onto the one who writes to nobody in significance, to no existential public. you now get to experience how you attach to nobody, how nobody even bothers to consider your standpoint. this means that everyone who attaches to the world is now selling, they are selling experiences of others, of women, of clothes, of music, they are not bargaining as it pertains to life, you are now selling to the public whenever you speak, you are letting them know that the world itself is just a question of purchasing the rights to be able to exist without defining that existence, but to still have points of relation. they didnt realize, that the men still interested in the law of life and not its economy, that they require a public of life to speak to. and this public of life is not just the community, not at all. this public of life thinks to interact with you even when they are not interacting with you. they are writing to you, even now, they need to know what you have to say, and they will have an impact on you outside of your writing. you will meet them, notice that they are acting on the world. that was koningsberg, that was warwick, and vienna, and pythagoras, and the original lyceum, and as such most groups that wrote to somebody, and managed to not find a public but find themselves in one. you cannot always foresee that this will happen, sometimes you are too busy revolutionarily disconnecting the remaining remnants of the world for the order of moderntiy, too blind to see how they will impact the rest of us. sometimes they dont know they are burning our last chance at living life in the way we have always come to know it, and kind of spawning the phantoms we were all running away from, just to see if they're exactly as bad as they are liberating, and the most obvious conclusion was indeed the one that was drawn by practically everyone in the world, when you're abandoned, you don't get saved by the random grace of a foregone alien or from god, you really do just end up having no authentic public, to enter into a permament mode of latent narcissism, lyotard's ideal of judgement without criteria only exists in the economy, but judgement altogether is absent as anything but an irritating artifact in actual urban life, which leads to decadent decay.
10/11/12/13 - this is the most fascinating paragraph yet, but for all the wrong reasons, here we see lyotard and the other guy (i havent unlocked him yet so hes the other guy for now, lyotard's sibling) are arguing in a way where they fail to meet eachother, as happens often, yet his sibling backs off right where he's not supposed to, likely on purpose, judging by how harshly lyotard re-inserts his point (and naturally hes supposed to, him not doing that there would cruically harm his project) but whats important to realize is that, "then I would say that there are presently few works that are modern" is the main sentence from the sibling, not the one that argues that modernity has a public of its own, nor where lyotard argues back with the idea that in modernity there is no longer a people, but rather much importantly before the statement is even made, with "that is, the law of taste, by discovering a new reader above this law, in a beyond of taste", this is where he collapses criticism entirely, which is, in contemporary terms, where we currently are. the subject of taste is a subject of preference, taste and preference can no longer be divided or understood, because the subject and object in art are left in a confused state, and the term art itself carries with it, quite burdeningly, the entire weight of all of its history, right on the terminological deficit that it brings towards itself "that is not art". in that same way, the question of taste becomes not a market, but something that has no footing, nothing to protect. lyotard is more correct in regards to the law, where he says there is no longer an integration of ethnic music into the market and only a popular music into the mass market, and he knows that there are romantic people still listening to ethnic music, but he misunderstands his siblings point, that in fact, they are all romantic people, in that none of them view popular music as pop music, but through the critical and antiquated lense of ethnic music. yet, those that have indeed adjusted to the new categorical criteria of the non-critical mass, the new, arranged rather than constitutive public, are present, but are in fact incapable, as was previously seen, to be able to find their place in the new law. and this doesnt leave an option and a lack of an option respectively for both the law and the market or economy, but rather it strips both of the possibility to interact with one another. the law finds no place in the economy, and the economy has no laws for its people, and both of them are built to resist one another endlessly. this is a dilemma with no solution, because the romantics remain antiquated in their search for a critical gesture towards the categories (yet behave as though they are blind to the higher powers and stronger, more ironic yet soft wits of the arranged masses), and yet the masses themselves can never approach art anymore in a way where they can identify themselves with it or form their indentity, so they seek, and fail to put their foot down onto the floor that cant quite meet their vested interest, nor form their identity.
13.5 - btw it aint commentary by commentary i mean smth else like a whole referendum of names or like fixed concepts that are defined to a specific origin point. like idk i can make up some bs, like lacan's real isnt the same as zizek's penis because deleuze's narrative in the logic of sense about the real doesnt correspond to sabrina carpenters idea in her new single etc like imagine that but being majority of the writing, with some minor personal notes in between reformatting or reexpressing the views but not doing a full eisegsis like i am here where im trying to one up the piece lol. also my professors wrong that i cant do an eisegsis on contemporary peers, ofc i can, i can make up a half decent eisegesis in three hours, i dont need to be 50 years in the future to do it (although that obviously makes it far easier)
14 - i think lyotards direction of judgement without criteria is correct, but i think it misses how the criteria is categorically a market preference, as i have said. but the problem with posing the question of criteria already escapes the problem of taste. assertive opinionated "judgements" themselves are no longer judgements in the reformed way of montaigne, but in the lowly way of schiller (or at least, lowly in the sense that even though it made sense back then, today it doesnt, so it seems lowly as us, as if it it was a political simulation of snobbery - and we can barely see to its true nature).
so as such, the question of criteria is already a market choice, an imposition or a regulation, a territorial claim, that is why i call it categorical, it is existrentially binding to your direction, your affiliation. the judgement has a criteria, but it is no longer just, thats why earlier i called it not of the law. lyotard is speaking obviously from the position of modernity's ideal subject constantly, but he cannot be doing this when hes trying to cultivate the image of modernity himself. this is because in the future, we can see how his intentional naivety in the form of rebellion shows blindness to the causes. this is why we must never bite our own foot on purpose, at least not too early, before what we speak about can truly meta-morphize (get it?) (synkar, 2025)
- 18 - "jlt: I can see that, despite the absence of conceptual grounding, you are nonetheless able to decide, in every instance, saying, this is pagan, and this is not. Therefore you have a criterion. . . " jlt totally misunderstands the point of contestion here or the object of thought, as he goes on to declare lyotard has a criterion for his argument about where the lack of criterion sits in judgement. but this supposed criterion of lyotard isn't even referring to the judgement of art or literature, or otherwise the object under social study, but to a categorical pronouncement which it itself is allowed to behave in any way, it is precisely a postulation in that the value is found in lyotard rather than the criterion. lyotard may believe he has a criterion for it, but he is saying there is no communis sensis, he cannot form a worthwhile, lived experience of his claim as self-justified on account of this, he exists to supplant the claim. and then he makes a similar claim of this, but a non meta one, so then you may wonder why his answer looks the way it does. but naturally, it makes sense, when it comes to it, he will want to defend judgement as sitting in the paradox between prescription and description when he announces that he has mere notions of truth and not prescriptive classifications, but merely that they are descriptive (but only from himself towards himself) yet also, he excuses it merely on pretense that the weight of his argument is so thin that he is allowed to behave about is a mere affiliated ideology and not as something that rests on its own, for hes too afraid to cast it into the barren judgement of the new world order, so he must protect it by making it worthless. yet he doesnt need to, for he himself had relativized the value of accounts on behalf of accounts of value, had he not? so it is merely a trick what he's doing now, to excuse himself so to speak.